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Rehman: A Himalayan Challenge

A HIMAL AYAN CHALLENGE
India’s Conventional Deterrent and the Role of Special Operations
Forces along the Sino-Indian Border
Iskander Rehman

E

ver since 1962, when soldiers from the People’s Republic of China inflicted
a humiliating defeat on Indian forces, India and China have maintained an
uneasy coexistence along the world’s longest disputed frontier.1 While certain aspects of the Sino-Indian security dynamic have improved markedly, others have
given rise to growing unease. On the positive side of the ledger, the two nations
have succeeded in avoiding a direct, armed conflict since a bloody skirmish in
1967, and have developed a number of confidence-building measures to prevent
isolated incidents from spiraling out of control. Similarly, neither country any
longer actively sponsors proxies or foments insurgencies on the other’s soil. Analysts also have pointed to the relative stability of the Sino-Indian nuclear dyad,
which does not appear to present the same escalatory risks as the India-Pakistan
strategic relationship.2
Other issues and developments, however, are cause for concern. While the
Sino-Indian relationship may have become less overtly conflictual, the military
rivalry between the two rising Asian powers has taken on different aspects and
has spread to new theaters. In addition to their long-standing border dispute,
there is now a maritime component to the Sino-Indian rivalry.3 Meanwhile,
enduring sources of tension—such as China’s
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the Line of Actual Control (LAC)—let alone resolve the issue. Finally, certain
ongoing trends in Chinese strategic behavior—whether in China’s near seas or
along the Sino-Indian border—have generated grave concern in New Delhi,
whose vocal strategic community regularly points to a perceived recrudescence
in Chinese border incursions.
Following one particularly tense standoff in 2013, the Indian government
confirmed the creation of a long-discussed new Mountain Strike Corps, with the
professed goal of reinforcing India’s conventional deterrent along the Sino-Indian
border. This massive accretion in manpower was presented as part of a larger,
more-sustained Indian effort to address a perceived growing military imbalance
with China. A core component of this effort has been to reinforce India’s basing
and transport infrastructure in a singularly austere operating environment. These
developments have been commented on widely, both in India and abroad. Yet
there has been a surprising lack of granular analysis of the Sino-Indian military
dynamic, whether in terms of the two states’ respective orders of battle, competitive advantages and disadvantages, or theater strategies.
Drawing on field trips to the Himalayan border states of Sikkim, Himachal
Pradesh, and Jammu and Kashmir as well as close to thirty interviews with intelligence officials and Indian Army (IA) and special forces officers, both serving and
retired, this article aims to give a clearer picture of the security situation along
the Sino-Indian border. In particular, it questions whether the Indian military’s
current operational concepts are sufficiently tailored to the nature of the terrain
and the evolving Chinese challenge. It suggests a more proactive approach to territorial defense, one that places a greater emphasis on the integration of forwarddeployed, highly mobile teams of Indian special operations forces (SOFs) coupled
with advanced intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR) and precisionstrike capabilities, and complemented by an extensive network of tribal scouts
and militias.
To develop this argument, this article proceeds in three substantive parts. The
first briefly summarizes the current military “state of play” along the border, outlining both countries’ respective orders of battle, modernization plans, and operational concepts. It argues that, while possibilities for greater escalation always
exist, in the near- to medium-term future any Sino-Indian territorial conflict is
likely to be relatively limited in scope and short in duration, rather than a protracted, large-scale, force-on-force campaign.4 Such a conflict also would differ
in a number of key characteristics from the war of 1962, most notably in that it
would take place under a nuclear shadow and with the likely involvement of air,
space, and cyber assets.
The second section conducts a survey of the literature on special operations
and mountain warfare, and reflects on the role that Indian SOFs could play in
https://digital-commons.usnwc.edu/nwc-review/vol70/iss1/6
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the event of a limited Sino-Indian border war. Their potential function as a force
multiplier is examined along three axes, or spectra, of conflict: their ability to
counter acts of creeping coercion, or “gray-zone aggression”; their aptitude to
perform vital enabling functions in mutually denied or deeply contested areas;
and their capacity to wage special warfare campaigns across the Plateau of Tibet.
Throughout, the article draws attention to the distinct geographic characteristics
of the putative battle space; the high elevations, harsh temperatures, and rugged
topography of many critical subregions along the border would have a defining
impact on any combat operations.
The third and final section evaluates whether India has developed the requisite capabilities to implement such a nimble, proactive strategy. It examines this
question through a tripartite lens, focusing on the operational, institutional, and
political-strategic barriers to implementing such a strategic shift. The research
findings are summarized in the conclusion.
THE SINO-INDIAN MILITARY DYNAMIC ALONG THE LAC: THE
CURRENT STATE OF PLAY
Certain misperceptions endure regarding the military balance along the SinoIndian border. The most common is that China’s localized military strength
along the LAC far outweighs India’s.5 In reality, India possesses a clear advantage
in sheer number of troops. With regard to airpower, New Delhi also holds something of an edge over its trans-Himalayan rival, even though it may be eroding
rapidly—in large part owing to the continued hemorrhaging of India’s fighter
fleet and the growing density and sophistication of China’s integrated air defense
system (IADS) in the Tibetan Autonomous Region (TAR).6 The vulnerability of
India’s air-basing infrastructure to artillery and missile strikes is, as we shall see,
another concern. When it comes to mobile and lightweight artillery—perhaps
one of the most critical factors, given the nature of the terrain—China holds the
upper hand, in large part because of India’s unending procurement woes in this
domain.7
However, a simple bean-counting approach to the Sino-Indian military balance, based on various correlations of forces, rapidly reveals its limits. Indeed,
analysts long have pointed to the manifold difficulties inherent in measuring
military power and effectiveness. A nation’s “conversion capability,” or its capacity
to convert resources into a balanced, well-trained, and technologically proficient
force, is a key metric when gauging military power.8 Another is its ability to tailor
its strategies and force structure effectively to the nature of the threat it faces.9
When examining the continental dimensions of the Sino-Indian military rivalry, four factors are important to keep in mind.
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The first is the difference between the countries’ territorial defense postures.
Whereas India maintains a large (and growing) body of troops relatively close to
the border, China’s military presence in the TAR is more limited. In accordance
with its doctrine on frontier defense, China stations most of its conventional
forces in its interior, to be surged in times of crisis.10 This posture has been facilitated by the impressive development of China’s highway and high-speed railway
networks, particularly the extension of the Qinghai–Tibet railway.11 These logistical feats have not been lost on Indian planners, who estimate that Beijing could
dispatch several divisions to the LAC within a few days.12
The second defining factor is the nature of the climate and terrain. Topographically, different portions of the LAC vary substantially. Areas along the Indian
side are not amenable to mechanized warfare, except certain parts of Ladakh
and northern Sikkim. Owing to the high elevations of the Plateau of Tibet, Chinese ground forces benefit from some commanding advantages—they overlook
many Indian forward positions, rendering surveillance and artillery operations
easier to execute—and are better acclimatized physiologically to high-altitude
warfare.13 On the other hand, the altitudes of the TAR make high-tempo air
campaigns more difficult: at very high altitudes jet engines take longer to ignite
owing to lower air density, and fighter aircraft are constrained in terms of their
overall payload capacity. The weather also can have an inordinate impact on the
planning and conduct of military operations: in mountainous environments, meteorological conditions are highly unpredictable and can shift drastically within
a few hours.14 Extreme cold, altitude, and weather affect almost every element of
military equipment, ranging from artillery cannon to helicopter rotors.15 Even
precision-guided aerial munitions can undergo significant performance variations at very high altitudes.16 During the harsh winters, certain mountain passes
can be inaccessible temporarily, while other regions, such as Aksai Chin, paradoxically can be rendered more passable for heavy vehicles by the presence of a
thicker layer of frost and ice. In Arunachal Pradesh, some of the world’s heaviest
quantities of rainfall regularly cause landslides, disrupting motorized traffic and
troop movements.
The third major factor is the infrastructure disparity along the LAC. Whereas
Chinese troops can gain rapid access to most areas along the LAC, Indian troops
often have to trek several hours, if not days, to attain certain areas.17 The People’s
Liberation Army (PLA) also benefits from a much more robust, multilayered
communications architecture, having laid fiber-optic cabling and installed numerous small-aperture terminal satellite stations.18
Finally, the two nations have erected very different command structures along
the border. Whereas in India the responsibility for the defense of the LAC is divided among several regional army and air force commands, in February 2016
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China announced a major military rezoning that folded the former Chengdu and
Lanzhou Military Regions into one unified western theater command.19 This will
have an impact on China’s military effectiveness in the event of conflict, noted
one Indian defense analyst, allowing for greater unity of effort and a “more rationalized marshalling of military resources.”20
CHINA’S REVITALIZED WAR-ZONE STRATEGY AND THE
EVOLUTION OF INDIA’S TERRITORIAL DEFENSE
China’s Revitalized War-Zone Strategy
Chinese war planning traditionally has placed a heavy emphasis on preemptive
military action as a means of seizing the initiative and throwing an adversary off
balance. Considered under the overarching rubric of active defense, PLA operations in the Korean War of the early 1950s, the Sino-Indian War of 1962, and the
Sino-Vietnamese War of 1979 all have been qualified by Chinese analysts as “selfdefensive counterattacks,” even though in each case it was Beijing that launched
general hostilities.21 For Chinese thinkers, there is no clear conceptual firewall
separating defensive grand strategies from offensive military tactics. To the contrary, preemptive military action is framed as an integral part of the Chinese concept of escalation management, or war control.22 Beijing’s military planning with
regard to the Sino-Indian border is a reflection of this tradition, and of its broader
thinking on “war-zone campaigns” and “winning informationized local wars.”
With the dissolution of the Soviet Union at the end of the Cold War, the PLA
began to redefine some of its core strategies and concepts. The war-zone campaign doctrine, formulated in the 1990s, placed a new emphasis on jointness,
transtheater mobility, and the rapid massing of strength on a particular front.23
Writings called for the concentration of “elite forces and sharp arms” and stressed
the importance of “gaining initiative from striking first” and “fighting a quick
battle to force a quick resolution.” When it came to conflicts along China’s terrestrial borders, it was argued that a growth in the effectiveness of transregional
support operations—principally via enhanced rail mobility—would allow the
PLA to surge units stationed deep within China’s interior rapidly. These forces
would be shielded by interlocking “mobility corridors” generated by early strikes
on an adversary’s standoff platforms or the movement of mobile surface-to-air
missile (SAM) batteries.24 China’s concept of informationized local wars, which
complements in many ways the war-zone campaign doctrine, attaches inordinate
importance to operations in the cyber and space domains and to prevailing in the
electromagnetic spectrum.25
Many of these key tenets permeate contemporary Chinese military thinking
with regard to future operations along the LAC. Thus, in the event of a conflict
with India, conventional forces would be surged from the Chinese interior, with
Published by U.S. Naval War College Digital Commons, 2017
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the vast majority being deployed via rail, and another portion being flown in
via heavy airlifter, and potentially also via government-requisitioned civilian
aircraft.26 As Larry Wortzel has noted, the Chinese fully seem to expect that air,
cyber, and electronic operations will be part of any Sino-Indian border contingency.27 A key role of the PLA Air Force (PLAAF), along with the PLA Rocket
Force (PLARF), would be to conduct standoff strikes to interdict, disrupt, and
delay the arrival of Indian forces coming from the lowlands. As one Chinese
military analyst notes, “Along the Sino-Indian borders, where the IA enjoys . . .
manpower superiority vis-à-vis the PLA, the PLAAF will launch ‘shielding bombardment’ campaigns in a defensive land war to rebuff the enemy’s second-tier
infantry and logistical reinforcement. If India’s supporting units are delayed in
getting to the battlefield, PLA reinforcements from the rear can arrive at the front
line to consolidate the defense line and launch a counterattack.”28
PLA SOF units no doubt would be central to China’s concept of “key counterattacks.” According to the PLA’s The Science of Campaigns, one of the key roles
of Chinese special operations units would be “to assault enemy vital targets,
paralyze enemy operational systems, reduce enemy operational capabilities,
and interfere, delay, or disrupt enemy operational activities to create favorable
conditions for main force units.”29 One recently retired Indian SOF general drew
attention to this aspect of Chinese thinking on special operations, noting, “If a
divisional size attack is launched, say, in Tawang, then the Chinese could employ
SOFs to cut off all routes for buildup of reserves, attack specific sensors, and also
raid artillery and logistic locations. The deep induction of SOFs for providing
early warnings and information on the movement of Indian reserves could also
be tasked.”30
China’s Western Military Region possesses its own SOF brigade (formerly attached to the Chengdu Military Region) and both the Xinjiang and TAR Military
Districts have large, dedicated SOF units, as well as elite, rapid-reaction units of
People’s Armed Police (PAP).31
India also has been following, with a certain degree of trepidation, the rapid
development of China’s airborne assault capabilities, in the form of the PLAAF’s
15th Airborne Corps. Consisting of three divisions numbering over 35,000
troops, with a light artillery and mechanized component, the 15th Airborne
Corps is headquartered in Xiaogan, from which it is expected to reach any part
of China within ten hours.32 The Central Military Commission has prioritized its
modernization, and its capabilities recently were bolstered by the introduction of
the Y-20 heavy airlifter.33 The 15th Airborne Corps is considered “key to the War
Zone Campaign Concept” and would be used “for the kind of disruptive deep
strikes that the War Zone Campaign calls for.”34 Indian military planners have
monitored closely the growing number of large-scale airborne exercises the PLA
https://digital-commons.usnwc.edu/nwc-review/vol70/iss1/6
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has conducted in the TAR over the past few years, with one retired air marshal
making the following observation: “We are aware of China’s increasing focus on
airborne assault operational capability, involving integrated forces. . . . A future
[limited] war could see the Chinese depending heavily on their airpower for
air defense and air support. Offensive operations would be SOF- and air assault
forces–intensive, unlike the simple infantry operations of 1962 vintage.”35
India’s concerns over certain aspects of the PLA’s war-zone campaign doctrine
and evolving force structure have been amplified by recent developments in
China’s strategic behavior, most notably along the Sino-Indian border but also
in the South and East China Seas. Since the eastern Ladakh border standoff in
2013, there have been a number of similarly fraught confrontations.36 One such
incident in 2014 reportedly led to the deployment of close to one thousand troops
by each side.37 Territorial incursions have continued ever since, with notable tensions flaring in September 2015 and, most recently, in March 2016.38
The Evolution of India’s Attitude toward Territorial Defense
India’s responses to China’s intensified military coercion have been twofold. First,
the country has decided to augment its force structure significantly, with new
battalions of scouts; via the stationing of additional air, missile, and surveillance
assets; and by raising a new Mountain Strike Corps. Second, it has sought to
remedy one of its key defensive shortcomings: the paucity of rail and road infrastructure in certain key border regions.
The latter represents an important shift away from the so-called scorchedearth strategy that had held sway since 1962. For many decades Indian military
planners deliberately eschewed the development of border infrastructure, as
they feared it would facilitate Chinese ingress deep into the Indian plains and
lowlands.39 According to one informed journalistic account of the Indian military’s thinking vis-à-vis the Sino-Indian border, it was only in the middle of the
first decade of this century that the IA began to see the pitfalls of this approach
more clearly.40 The lack of solid infrastructure along the Indian side of the LAC
had rendered large tracts of contested land acutely vulnerable to Chinese probing and creeping forms of encroachment. Trudging through treacherous terrain
on foot or via mule train, Indian patrols often discovered Chinese preparation of
positions or infrastructure development only weeks after it had occurred. In the
depth of winter, when snow rendered some footpaths impassable, Indian forces
tacitly conceded certain areas, only to reinvest them in the spring. In the event of
a standoff, China could surge reinforcements more rapidly, with Indian troops
perhaps taking hours, if not days, to arrive at their destination. In short, while
an absence of infrastructure conceivably could help delay a large-scale invasion,
it had proved remarkably inadequate at deterring Chinese military coercion and
territorial encroachment.41
Published by U.S. Naval War College Digital Commons, 2017
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It also had become gradually more apparent that a short-duration, limited,
border conflict is far more likely than a protracted, large-scale, force-on-force
campaign, not only because of the nature of current Chinese operational planning, but because both nations would be conducting military operations under a
nuclear overhang. As one much-discussed Indian report noted in 2012, “Though
both countries have a doctrine of ‘no first use,’ the nuclear factor can be expected
to impose caution on political decision makers on both sides. The stakes at issue
will again determine the degree of risk in political calculations. Generally, the
nuclear factor can be expected to limit the scale of conflict and impact the scope
of feasible political objectives.”42
Finally, the longer the conflict lasts, the more likely it will attract third-party
intervention in the form of diplomatic or military assistance or both. According
to declassified Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) reports, this was one of the
main reasons China planned for a short, limited war in 1962.43
Responding to a limited-war contingency requires operational agility and the
ability to respond rapidly and effectively to a crisis.44 This reinforces the need for
a tighter web of infrastructure that can enable Indian forces to react promptly to
any “tremor felt along any one of its strands.”45
Over the past few years, India has launched a bevy of large-scale border infrastructure projects, albeit with chequered results. While some progress has been
made in certain areas, most of India’s road and rail construction projects have
fallen victim to considerable delays. As of May 2016, only twenty-one of sixty-one
border road projects designated strategic had been completed.46 Similarly, while
the Indian government sanctioned the construction of twenty-eight strategic railway lines along India’s borders in 2010, six years later none have been finalized.47
The accretion of India’s conventional force structure along the LAC and the
attendant development in infrastructure provide two material indicators of the
shift in India’s defense strategy toward China. The most significant change, however, has occurred in the intellectual domain, as Indian defense planners have
adopted a much more vigorous, tactically offensive approach to territorial defense. The creation of the Mountain Strike Corps, note Indian commentators,
was part of a larger movement toward deterrence by punishment and away from
what has been perceived to be an overreliance on deterrence by denial in the
past.48 Indeed, for many decades India’s two-front planning construct called for
India simply to hold along the border with China while its forces engaged in
more-offensive operations against Pakistan to the west.49
This approach progressively has been replaced with what has been described
to this author variously as a form of “offensive defense,” a “quid pro quo strategy,”
and a “cross-border riposte strategy.” Following Clausewitz’s well-known dictum
that “a swift and vigorous assumption of the offensive” is often the most “brilliant
https://digital-commons.usnwc.edu/nwc-review/vol70/iss1/6

Printer_Winter2017Review.indb 113

10

12/15/16 1:53 PM

114

NAVA L WA R C O L L E G E R E V I E W

Rehman: A Himalayan Challenge

point in the defensive,” Indian military planners have adapted their concepts of
operation to the natures of both the opponent and the topography.50 As one army
colonel candidly noted, mountainous terrain “can favor the first mover,” adding,
Once the Chinese seize a position, it may be very difficult to dislodge them. Rather
than expend much blood and treasure attempting to storm impregnable positions, we
should pursue a strategy of horizontal escalation and capture territory elsewhere. If
you cannot counter symmetrically, you can effectively counter by shifting the locus of
the battlefield. The political compulsions of territorial defense make things very difficult for us in the Army. Our elected government will not tolerate us losing even one
centimeter of territory. This cannot be achieved without us seizing territorial chips
for bargaining purposes elsewhere. We have to think of conflict termination.51

Another IA officer concurred, observing, “Raising the strike corps was part of a
move to create a more offensive defense. If India’s sovereignty is weakened, we
should have the ability to mount a riposte. If the PLA strikes at Tawang, we can
provide a mechanized Indian response via Ladakh. In the past we had a dissuasive
posture, solely focused on static defense. Deterrence is now being rebalanced.”52
Both Ladakh and northern Sikkim are considered good locations for mounting such a mechanized riposte, not only because they provide some of the few
staging areas along the Indian side of the LAC conducive to mechanized warfare,
but because they overlook main axes of approach (the plateau of Aksai Chin and
the Sora Funnel) and logistical lifelines, such as the China Western Highway.53
In the event of conflict, India’s mechanized forces would sweep down from these
mountain plains to conduct pincer movements behind advancing Chinese formations, with the hope of breaking troop concentration.54
India’s mechanized counteroffensive would form only one component of a
wider theater strategy, however. In addition to these movements, Indian air and
missile power would be brought to bear on transport and communication nodes
deep within the TAR, with the goal of delaying or preventing the arrival of PLA
reinforcements.55
INCORPORATING SOFS INTO INDIA’S CURRENT APPROACH TO
AREA DENIAL
Despite this shift toward a more offensive form of area denial, India’s current
approach to conventional deterrence along the LAC appears to suffer from
certain limitations. Indeed, while New Delhi’s overarching military strategy has
evolved—most notably by more vigorously stressing the need for cross-border
strikes—the force structure changes it preconizes are remarkably similar to those
pursued in the wake of the 1962 war: a massive accretion in conventional land
power.56
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New Delhi also continues to rely on geographically dispersed conventional
units or on poorly equipped paramilitary forces, the latter in the form of the
Indo-Tibetan Border Police (ITBP), as India’s first line of defense in many of the
forward areas most vulnerable to Chinese aggression.57 The rugged nature of the
topography, along with the continued paucity of infrastructure, means that even
though India forward-deploys a large number of conventional screening forces
along some of the most obvious axes of approach (the five main river valleys in
Arunachal Pradesh, for instance), these troops are relatively static and could be
outflanked by small detachments engaging in rapid lateral movements.58
Meanwhile, a large portion of the IA’s mechanized units still will be stationed
in the lowlands, with the expectation that they would be rushed to higher altitudes in the event of conflict. Not only would this prove logistically challenging
owing to the enduring deficits in India’s road and rail infrastructure; it also would
prove physically taxing.59 In contrast to the first wave of PLA troops flowing from
the heights of the Plateau of Tibet, Indian troops deployed from interior garrisons
would be surged into combat before having been acclimatized properly.60 Medical
studies have shown that a physically fit soldier requires about two weeks to adapt
progressively to a new altitude, and three weeks to conditions of extreme cold.61
In the absence of proper acclimatization, soldiers operating at extreme altitudes
can suffer from acute mountain sickness, severe sleep disorders, high-altitude
pulmonary edema, and cerebral edema.62
Second, such a manpower-centered approach to deterrence already has proved
to be prohibitively costly. In April 2015, Defence Minister Manohar Parrikar
announced that the planned Mountain Strike Corps would be halved to approximately 35,000 troops for financial reasons, and that the formation budget for the
corps would be frozen at U.S.$6.1 billion, significantly less than the originally
sanctioned U.S.$13.8 billion.63 Scandal already had erupted a year earlier when
it was revealed that the IA had been compelled to dip into precious weapon and
ammunition reserves to equip its newly raised forces properly.64 While the Indian
defense minister appears to have reversed his prior decision, renewing assurances
that the Mountain Strike Corps would be resourced properly, India’s efforts to
add thousands more boots on the ground inevitably will prove onerous.65 Indeed,
India’s expansion of its ground forces has been accompanied by a rise in personnel costs, a trend that is slated to increase exponentially over time.66
Finally, the natural compartmentalization of much of the terrain—which often
does not allow large units to maneuver effectively—disincentivizes the massing of
force, especially when moving uphill.67 As India’s conventional forces wind their
way up narrow, mountain roads to higher elevations or are funneled through
mountain valleys, they could find themselves targeted by Chinese artillery barrages, missile strikes, and “shielding bombardment campaigns.” They might
https://digital-commons.usnwc.edu/nwc-review/vol70/iss1/6
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suffer disproportionate casualties when targeted by Chinese forces positioned
in height and depth or find their main axes of approach to certain remote areas
suddenly cut off.68
In short, India’s intense reliance on large, centralized, conventional forces—a
substantial portion of which are stationed at lower altitudes—would not be the
most operationally judicious approach in the event of a short, fast-moving, limited war launched from high elevations along the LAC.
One French study on mountain warfare notes that for conventional forces to
assail higher-altitude positions successfully, they must rely on a “different yet
complementary force,” that is, a force that is “decentralized, highly trained, and
optimized for heliborne assault and the neutralization of enemy positions located
at higher vantage points.”69 The next section of this article makes an argument
for providing the IA with a similarly “different yet complementary force”—one
that is forward deployed, distributed, and able to respond both rapidly and effectively to various contingencies. The candidate force—a mixture of SOFs and
locally raised scouting battalions—would be geared toward rapid reaction and
proactive defense.
The argument is not that large-scale conventional forces have no role to play
in the event of a Sino-Indian border contingency, or that India should rely exclusively on special operations for conventional deterrence along the border. Many
of the missions at the heart of India’s operational concepts—such as the seizure
of limited tracts of territory—are suited to mountain infantry, not SOFs.70 Rather,
the emphasis is on developing a better complementarity between these elements
rather than on clearly dissociating them. Indeed, it has been demonstrated repeatedly that modern militaries are at their most effective when they succeed
in integrating conventional and special operations within a common, clearly
defined, strategic framework.71
PROACTIVE DEFENSE AND THE ROLE OF SPECIAL OPERATIONS
FORCES
This section evaluates the role of India’s SOFs within the framework of a more
proactive territorial defense strategy. India possesses a large number and variety
of elite units, some of which fall under the Home Affairs Ministry, such as the
National Security Guard (NSG), which focuses almost exclusively on counter
terrorism (CT) operations, and the Special Protection Group, a VIP-protection
unit. To add to the confusion, some units occasionally qualified as SOFs in India, such as the IA Ghatak platoons and the Sagar Prahari Bal—the latter a unit
formed following the 2008 Mumbai attacks to provide better coastal security—
are not so much special operators as specialized forces.
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The primary focus of this discussion is the SOF units most likely to play a
role in the event of a Sino-Indian border conflict: the SOF-qualified elements of
the IA’s Para Commando battalions and, to a lesser extent, the relatively newly
formed Garud unit of the Indian Air Force (IAF). At the time of this writing,
the IA possesses eight battalions of special operators (Para SFs), with plans for
future expansion, as well as five battalions (a brigade) of airborne paras, which
are more akin to airborne assault units.72 Each battalion nominally is pegged at
approximately seven hundred men, but many units reportedly are undermanned,
underequipped, and suffering from a 30 percent officer shortfall. The Garud,
which was formed in 2003, currently comprises about one thousand troops, and
their numbers will double in the aftermath of the attacks on Pathankot Air Base
in early 2016.73 The IAF has struggled to define the role of the Garud adequately,
beyond base protection. (While the Indian Navy’s SOF component, the Marine
Commando Force [MARCOS], has been stationed in small numbers at certain
high-altitude lakes in Jammu and Kashmir, its role would be minimal at best, and
therefore MARCOS will not be addressed further.)
Another unit, the fabled Special Frontier Force (SFF), will be discussed in addition to the Para SFs and the Garud.74 Formed in late 1962, following the SinoIndian War, the SFF is part of India’s external intelligence agency, the Research
and Analysis Wing (RAW), and answers directly to the Cabinet Secretariat.75
Modeled on the Kennedy-era Green Berets, the unit is rumored to contain about
ten thousand soldiers, trained to conduct operations behind enemy lines and engage in special warfare.76 There is some debate over whether this secretive force
has preserved its elite status as well as its original mandate.
The roles of these units will be examined along three axes: their utility in countering gray-zone aggression, their aptitude for engaging in direct action behind
enemy lines, and their ability to conduct special warfare in the TAR.77
COUNTERING GRAY-ZONE AGGRESSION
Over the past few years, numerous observers have drawn attention to the challenge that acts of creeping coercion pose to the international order. These concerns have been compounded by revisionist powers’ shared predilection for socalled gray-zone strategies, a combination of “salami-slicing” tactics, information
warfare, and military coercion.78
Certain aspects of gray-zone campaigns, such as the use of proxies, long have
been familiar to Indian security managers, who have had to contend with such
modes of Pakistani covert action since independence.79 China’s historic use of
infrastructure development as a means of cementing—literally—its claim over
contested territory is also well known in New Delhi. After all, many past episodes
of border tension have occurred following Indian forces’ belated discovery of
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Chinese road and basing development in remote border areas. Despite India’s
familiarity with such forms of great-power competition, its strategic community’s
literature on the challenges that gray-zone aggression poses is surprisingly sparse.
Moreover, when Indian strategic thinkers reflect on such issues, they tend to do
so with Pakistan in mind rather than China. Yet as demonstrated in the first section of this article, the threat of gray-zone aggression should not be perceived as
exclusive to Indo-Pakistani security dynamics.
Within U.S. strategic circles, it is the special operations community that perhaps has thought the longest and hardest about how to counter such forms of
territorial encroachment effectively. As one recent official document notes, democracies can face certain disadvantages when confronting authoritarian rivals
whose decision-making and civil-military structures can facilitate “unity of effort
in the gray zone.”80
For the same reasons that SOFs can prove immensely attractive to democracies when prosecuting CT operations overseas—their tactical agility, deniability,
and restricted oversight—they are emerging as the tools of choice in responding
to certain features of authoritarian aggression.81 For example, in the event of
Chinese operatives landing on the Senkaku Islands (claimed by both China and
Japan), disguised as fishermen, Japanese military planners view “advance parties” of heliborne special forces as forming one of their first lines of defense.82
Similarly, central and eastern European states envision rapid-reaction SOF units
as providing some of the most effective counters to any future Russian attempt to
replicate a Crimean “little green men” strategy on NATO soil.83
SOFs provide democratic policy makers with the capacity to respond rapidly,
effectively, and in a tailored manner to such acts of infiltration, subversion, or
sabotage.84 In India’s case, a wide variety of scenarios were mentioned in the
course of private conversations with the author, such as Chinese clandestine
operatives or SOFs entering Arunachal Pradesh or Sikkim disguised as Tibetan
refugees, nomadic herdsmen, or economic migrants from India’s troubled northeastern territories.85 Indian military officers also expressed concern over their
past inability to detect Chinese infrastructure development in a timely fashion
and mentioned the possibility of Chinese engineers discreetly constructing small
landing grounds, hidden ammunition depots, and SAM sites during the offseason when Indian soldiers no longer can gain access to certain areas close to
Chinese positions, owing to snow and the paucity of infrastructure on the Indian
side of the LAC.86
To respond with alacrity to such scenarios, Indian SOFs would need, first
and foremost, to be able to detect them. India’s advances in space-based surveillance, along with the planned introduction of a large number of surveillance
platforms—in the form of high-altitude unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs) and
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aerostats—promise to help in this regard, but the difficult nature of the terrain
imposes limitations.87 India has been contemplating erecting Israeli-type security
systems along certain portions of its border with Pakistan, complete with nightobservation cameras, long-range detection radars, motion sensors, and thermal
imaging.88 However, the deep valleys and craggy peaks that prevail across much
of the LAC—not to mention the prohibitive expense—preclude such ambitious
technological solutions.89 Radio, radar, and even satellite communications systems have difficulty operating around terrain folds, and the very fact that the
Sino-Indian border has not been delineated officially means that China would
view any large-scale Indian fencing effort as a severe provocation.90
As a result, human intelligence (HUMINT) would prove absolutely critical in
detecting Chinese gray-zone operations, whether the latter were in the form of
cross-border infiltrations, illicit infrastructure development, or attempts at sabotage and subversion. For decades, Indian intelligence services have depended on
the knowledge gleaned from nomadic herders, who frequently wander between
Indian- and Chinese-controlled territory along the LAC.91 Religious pilgrims
and resident tribal populations provide other valuable sources of information.
India should seek to sharpen its HUMINT capabilities further along the LAC,
by recognizing that the key to preserving long-term control lies in the degree of
influence it wields over the complex patchwork of border peoples. For example,
in Arunachal Pradesh alone there are more than twenty-six major tribes and one
hundred subtribes.92 India should focus on training more of its intelligence officers and SOFs in the languages and dialects of the many peoples along the border
and on fast-tracking the central government’s much-delayed Border Area Development Program (BADP), with a particular focus on the regions most likely to be
the targets of future Chinese incursions, i.e., Arunachal Pradesh and Ladakh.93 A
less heavy-handed policing approach in certain areas also might prove constructive in terms of winning hearts and minds and might foster better information
sharing between local communities and Indian authorities.94
Finally, the addition of more tribal and local forces—in the vein of the Ladakh
Snow Tigers or the recently raised scout battalions from Sikkim and Arunachal—
would buttress considerably India’s conventional deterrent in its border regions.95
Not only does this constitute a low-cost approach to frontier policing; it also
provides Indian security managers with a year-round, forward-deployed, “trip
wire” force whose members are physiologically acclimatized to high altitudes and
mountain warfare and have an innate knowledge of the terrain and local conditions.96 Because of their familial ties with local villagers and herdsmen, these
scouts are better positioned to recognize signs of cross-border infiltration. Small
teams of Indian special forces—in the form of joint terminal attack controllers
(JTACs) or communications experts—could be attached to each battalion, much
Published by U.S. Naval War College Digital Commons, 2017

Printer_Winter2017Review.indb 120

17

12/15/16 1:53 PM

Naval War College Review, Vol. 70 [2017], No. 1, Art. 6

REHMAN

121

in the way the United States embedded small teams of SOFs among its Northern
Alliance partners during Operation ENDURING FREEDOM.97 This would provide
lightly armed tribal and ethnic battalions with the ability to call on airpower or
follow-on conventional forces in the event of an encounter with a more formidable foe. Equipping select teams of Sikkim and Arunachal Scouts with antitank
guided missiles, light mortars, and shoulder-mounted rocket launchers, in the
vein of the Ghatak platoons that act as the spearheads of conventional IA units,
also could prove valuable.98 The goal should be to provide the IA not only with
lightly armed reconnaissance units but also with hybridized structures that can
help mount a Fabian defense of their respective home states in the event of a
larger-scale Chinese incursion, by delaying, harassing, and attriting PLA forces.99
DIRECT ACTION AND ENABLING OPERATIONS
India, albeit somewhat more belatedly than China, has begun to attach more
importance to airborne assault operations, especially their utility for targeting
Chinese transport and communications infrastructure in the TAR in the event of
conflict.100 There is also a growing realization among some military thinkers that
Indian SOFs could be called on to play a critical role behind enemy lines, conducting sabotage, reconnaissance, and direct-action operations. While one serving IA special forces colonel cautiously stated that “Indian SOFs would be used
for direct action operations primarily on Indian soil, with the occasional cross
border deployment in a limited manner,” another IA special forces brigadier was
less circumspect, observing that “India’s dissuasive posture being based in part
on the threat of horizontal escalation, SOF operations behind Chinese lines will
necessarily be part of the mix.”101 IA doctrine, for its part, defines special forces
as “specially selected troops who are trained, equipped, and organized to operate in hostile territory, isolated from the main combat forces. They may operate
independently or in conjunction with other forces at the operational level. They
are versatile, have a deep reach, and can make precision strikes at targets of critical importance.”102
It is this last function—the ability to strike at rear-based targets—that seems
to hold the most appeal for Indian military planners. There is a recognition that
the combat environment straddling the Sino-Indian border may morph progressively into something of a no-man’s-land for large clusters of ground forces and
high-signature platforms, owing to the growing ubiquity of extended-range,
precision-guided munitions. The PLA’s increased focus on transtheater mobility
and the ability to deploy SAMs, truck-mounted UAVs, and land-attack cruise
missile batteries rapidly along its side of the LAC has engendered particular
anxiety in New Delhi.103 Indian advanced landing grounds and air bases are increasingly vulnerable to missile and artillery bombardment.104 Furthermore, the
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government has yet to finalize the construction of hardened shelters for the IAF’s
squadrons of Su-30MKI aircraft.105 While Indian fighter pilots have begun to
train using sections of road and highway as dispersal runways, other passive defenses could be implemented, such as investing in large numbers of subterranean
shelters with large stockpiles of munitions, lubricants, and petroleum.106 Absent
such efforts, Indian airpower near the border effectively may be crippled in the
first phases of conflict, or could suffer from virtual attrition—devoting the bulk
of sorties to defensive counterair missions or to suppressing enemy air defenses,
rather than conducting precision strikes against enemy air bases and ground targets.107 This role, note some Indian military officials, may need to be entrusted to
small demolition teams of SOFs, which could carve “holes” in China’s reconnaissance strike complex and provide terminal guidance for standoff missile strikes
conducted from outside the range of China’s IADS networks. In some ways, this
resembles Soviet thinking on the deployment of Spetsnaz SOFs behind NATO
lines for sabotage and demolition missions against mobile missile batteries.108
This “penetrating role” is in line with the conceptualization by some U.S.
analysts of SOFs as low-signature entry forces within heavily denied or contested
environments.109 IAF doctrine specifies that the “destruction and degradation of
enemy air assets” constitute one of the core functions of its dedicated SOF unit,
the Garud.110 One retired IA brigadier confided the following:
In the conceptualized role of the mountain strike corps, the future Air Assault Division and Special Operations Forces will operate in tandem as part of India’s area
denial strategy. What is implied is, SOFs will be inserted up to and beyond an operational depth to disrupt the build-up of PLA forces, isolate and invest critical vulnerable points and areas. These isolated vulnerable points will then be attacked via air
assaults through heliborne and airborne forces. It is important to keep in mind that
the Tibetan plateau is a plane with little undulations, which allows for the application
of both air assault forces as well as air assault mechanized forces.111

The challenge, however, would be to succeed in inserting SOF guidance and
demolition teams in the absence of dedicated, stealthy airlifters.112 Advances in
air-defense systems and long-range surface-to-surface fires have raised new questions about how to conduct airborne operations without incurring large-scale,
potentially catastrophic losses.113 Large, high-signature transport aircraft, such as
India’s C-17 Globemasters or C-130J Hercules, would be vulnerable to Chinese
radar-guided SAMs—providing the latter had not been suppressed prior to the
air assault. More-discreet modes of airborne insertion, e.g., via low-flying heliborne strike forces, still could be put at risk by lower-altitude air-defense systems
and antiaircraft guns.114 Indian troops most likely would need to establish drop
zones at a distance from the densest thickets of Chinese low-altitude systems
and rely on airborne light armored vehicles (LAVs) to gain greater mobility and
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firepower and compensate for the distances separating their lodgments from
their target points.115 The U.S. Army has been developing a new family of LAVs
designed for this particular role and Indian SOF officers expressed interest in acquiring several such vehicles, with future airborne assault operations in mind.116
Once successfully inserted, Indian SOF teams may need to operate “blind”
within an environment characterized by the denial of command, control, communications, computers, and ISR (i.e., C4ISR) capabilities, particularly if India’s
fragile space-based communications architecture has been degraded or disabled
preemptively. Mindful of this, the IA has released an updated request for information (RFI) for mini battlefield UAVs, which senior officers have indicated
would enable two-man IA SOF teams to conduct over-the-hill surveillance behind enemy lines.117 The introduction of longer-range, high-altitude UAVs, when
combined with a more-robust satellite and airborne communications network,
also could improve IA ability to locate and direct fire at enemy targets situated at
greater distances as well as to preserve communications among dispersed units.118
Finally, if a Chinese offensive indeed proves to be air assault–intensive, small
teams of Indian SOFs equipped with shoulder-mounted SAMs could prove invaluable. Given the rough, mountainous terrain, limited avenues of approach,
and growing ability of China to target larger formations of conventional forces,
SOFs could provide a key comparative advantage in this more defensive role.119
WAGING SPECIAL WARFARE IN THE TAR
The Tibetan issue always has been at the heart of Sino-Indian tensions.120 For
New Delhi, the PLA’s absorption of the mountain territory in 1951 signified the
loss of a historic buffer zone, and the progressive hardening of Beijing’s Tibet policies has caused both anger and dismay. For China, India’s harboring of the Dalai
Lama and the Tibetan government in exile following the 1959 Tibetan uprising
amounted to an almost unforgivable affront. Throughout the late 1950s and up
to the 1962 border war, Chinese intelligence remained absolutely convinced that
India was attempting to foment unrest across the Plateau of Tibet.121
Following India’s defeat, Prime Minister Jawaharlal Nehru made the fateful
decision—long encouraged by certain of his intelligence czars—to aid and abet
insurgency movements within Tibet and to arm India’s sizable Tibetan refugee
community.122 A large paramilitary unit, the ITBP, was raised and entrusted with
patrolling forward areas along the LAC.
In addition, a much more secretive force was established: the SFF. Composed
of thousands of ethnic Tibetans, many of whom had been resistance fighters in
the TAR or part of the Dalai Lama’s bodyguard, the SFF was an elite unit of paratroopers trained in mountain warfare, sabotage, and demolition. Commanded
by IA officers on special assignment, the unit is “managed” by RAW and reports
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directly to the Prime Minister’s Office via the Directorate General of Security in
the Cabinet Secretariat. The CIA played an important role in shaping the SFF’s
development in its early years, providing training and instruction in guerrilla
warfare tactics.123 Doctrinally, the unit is inspired heavily by Kennedy-era U.S.
Army Special Forces, with the Green Berets’ intellectual predilection for special
warfare and operations deep behind enemy lines.124 In fact, this was the SFF’s
original mandate. Some claim that Nehru even went so far as to frame the SFF as
the potential vanguard of a future liberation of Tibet from Chinese rule.125 Since
its creation, the SFF has played an active role in India’s regional conflicts, fighting behind enemy lines in Bangladesh alongside Indian-sponsored militias—the
Mukti Bahini—in the war of 1971, detonating bridges, and suffering, according
to some accounts, dozens of casualties.126 Unconfirmed reports also have indicated that the SFF played a role in the Indian military assault against the Golden
Temple, Operation BLUESTAR, in 1984 and in the Kargil War of 1999.127
The current state of the SFF is difficult to ascertain. The unit continues to exist and is based in the hill town of Chakrata, in the state of Uttarakhand. Details
pertaining to its force structure, equipment, and operational mandate in the
event of a Sino-Indian confrontation are considered extraordinarily sensitive.
Even retired IA special forces officers were distinctly uncomfortable when questioned on the matter. Some claimed complete ignorance, stating that the SFF’s
operations and training regimen were strictly compartmentalized, with little to
no interaction with regular military SOFs. This is clearly not the case, as Para SFs
are seconded to SFF units frequently. When queried on its alleged elite status, one
former IA general dismissed the SFF as little more than a “rag tag force, poorly
equipped and no longer commando-trained.”128 A smattering of press reports has
drawn attention to troubling shortages in certain essential pieces of equipment,
such as parachutes.129 There is also uncertainty surrounding the force’s dedicated
air-transport assets, now that the Aviation Research Center, RAW’s private air
wing and border-surveillance unit, has been dissolved and split between the IAF
and the National Technical Research Organization, a signals-intelligence agency
created in 2004.130 Overall, however, other interviewees’ assessments were at odds
with those of the general. Many expressed a grudging admiration for the toughness of those “Tibetan boys,” as well as that of the Gurkhas and hill tribesmen
who have swollen the SFF’s ranks over the years.
The main question, however, relates to the contemporary role of what some
have referred to as India’s “secret Tibetan army.” Ever since the late 1970s and the
tentative beginnings of Sino-Indian rapprochement, a tacit quid pro quo arrangement has been observed. China agreed to end its support for insurgent groups in
India’s troubled northeast, while India subscribed to a one-China policy and officially abandoned its clandestine efforts across the Tibetan border.131 However, the
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reality is somewhat more complex. Although China no longer directly supports
militancy in places such as Nagaland, Mizoram, and Assam, Chinese middlemen have been known to funnel in weaponry via countries in Southeast Asia.132
Meanwhile, other countries, such as Pakistan, continue to play an active role in
the area, raising questions over whether China chooses to maintain close ties with
certain of these groups via a third party.133 When it comes to India and Tibet,
there is a similar sense that New Delhi could revert to older policies if it found
itself compelled.134
For this reason—for purposes of what might best be described as a form of
unconventional deterrence—it would appear that the SFF has remained true to
its special warfare roots. One former planner within India’s Integrated Defence
Staff commented that, in his opinion, “in light of current circumstances, I see no
reason to dilute the operational mandate.”135 A recently retired Para SF lieutenant general responded in a more oblique fashion, saying that “envisioning what
role the Tibetan boys would play does not require much imagination.”136 Serving
officers either refused to respond or simply suggested that there had been “no
change in their tasking.”137
One might question, however, whether the SFF would be able to prosecute
such a campaign successfully in today’s environment. First, such an effort most
probably would be far more isolated than if it had occurred during the early to
mid-1960s, when the SFF was established. During that period, both Nepal and
the United States played an active role, alongside India, in supporting Tibetan
militancy. In fact, for many years it was the ancient kingdom of Mustang, in Nepal, that served as the true epicenter and safe haven for Tibetan combatants.138 By
the end of that decade, however, China had succeeded in convincing Nepal to betray the Tibetan cause, while the United States had sacrificed its anticommunist
freedom fighters on the altar of Nixonian rapprochement with China.139 In the
event of another conflict, India essentially would find itself conducting the bulk
of its covert campaigns alone. Depending on the circumstances, one could envision the United States discreetly providing a modicum of intelligence support,
but not much more. Even if SFF task forces are inserted successfully, it might
prove extremely challenging to sustain them, given the contested nature of the
aerial environment over Tibet. Investment in systems such as the U.S.-developed
Joint Precision Airdrop System, which can be dropped from a height of 25,000
feet, might alleviate this challenge.140
Another key difference lies in the extent of China’s surveillance and control
over Tibet, which is far greater today than it was in 1962. Since the 2008 disturbances, in particular, Beijing has improved vastly its internal security apparatus
in the TAR. New, highly sophisticated frontier-monitoring systems, incorporating electro-optical devices, radars, unmanned aircraft, and tools for imagery
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analysis, have been put in place. Tibetan communities in India have registered a
sharp drop in the number of incoming refugees—many who seek to depart are
apprehended or shot while attempting to cross the border.141 China recently enacted a draconian new counterterror law that further curtails Tibetans’ freedom
of movement and expression, and Chinese intelligence officers have deeply penetrated Tibetan monasteries and refugee networks.142 Surveillance of neighborhoods has been amplified via the establishment of an intricate “grid system” and
facilitated by the forced sedentarization of historically nomadic populations.143
PAP forces, often formed from recently decommissioned PLA troops, have
grown ever more numerous in Tibet and increasingly militarized, incorporating heliborne rapid-reaction units and equipped with armored vehicles.144 Their
presence, in addition to the PLA element already stationed in the TAR, could
present a formidable challenge to Indian special warfare efforts. Moreover, it remains unclear whether the majority of the younger generation of Tibetans living
on the Indian side of the border would be as willing to take up arms alongside
their brethren as some have claimed.145 Finally, as we shall see in greater depth
in a later section, India’s political leaders might be reticent to deploy the SFF in
such a role, either because they viewed such a step as too escalatory or because it
would lead to protraction, thus impeding war termination.
THE CHALLENGES TO IMPLEMENTING A STRATEGY OF
PROACTIVE DEFENSE
Technical and Operational Hurdles
The first and most immediate set of hurdles resides in the technical and operational domain. Numerous observers, both within and outside India’s special
operations community, have drawn attention to chronic shortfalls in essential
equipment, such as parachutes, night vision devices, communications devices,
laser designators, and high-altitude clothing.146 U.S. SOFs, having observed their
Indian counterparts during training exercises, noticed that in many cases Indian
paratroopers preferred to discard their expensive Israeli-designed Tavor rifles—
which are ill suited for Himalayan conditions and occasionally jam—in favor of
the more reliable AK-47.147
Another common complaint was that the SOFs had expanded too rapidly in
size and in an ad hoc manner, without the benefit of careful, deliberate planning.148 As a result, noted one colonel, in numerous cases during the raising of
Para SF battalions existing equipment sourced from regular infantry regiments
was distributed among the new units, resulting in their soldiers having to make
do with inferior equipment.149 In some cases, observers pointed to seemingly
prosaic concerns as having genuine security implications. One example is the
continued absence of aluminum, belt-attachable water bottles. Indian Para SF
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personnel often are compelled to carry large, heavy, plastic bottles of potable water in their rucksacks. When removed, these reflect very far out into the sunshine
and off the snow—running the risk of revealing hidden positions.150
Another issue concerns officer manpower, especially declining retention rates.
Most Para SF units suffer from an estimated officer shortfall of 25–30 percent.151
As one brigadier general stationed at IA headquarters noted, a growing number
of Indian SOF officers are leaving the service to pursue more-lucrative careers in
the private sector, where they often specialize in VIP protection.152 It is important
to note, in passing, that this problem is not specific to India; the United States
faces a similar challenge.153 The net result, however, is that India’s SOFs are increasingly “bottom heavy,” with a large number of fresh, new recruits but too few
experienced officers and noncommissioned officers.
This overly rapid expansion also has exposed certain deficiencies in India’s
SOF training infrastructure. SOF officers warned in 2010 that it would take
“many years” for the IA’s Special Forces Training School (SFTS)—located in Nahan, 300 km to the north of Delhi—to catch up with the expanded force’s new
requirements.154 Foreign observers note that the SFTS still lacks key facilities,
such as vertical wind tunnels, next-generation simulators, and sufficient firing
ranges.155
Questions also were raised about the nature of certain aspects of the selection
and training processes, which often are delegated to each individual battalion,
and how to ensure consistent standards. Indian SOF officers, however, were of the
view that this more-decentralized system had its advantages, as it allowed units
to be highly specialized in certain niche competencies and to have “excellent area
and terrain specialization.”156
Organizational and Doctrinal Challenges
Perhaps the greatest set of challenges lies in the organizational domain. Absent a
restructuring of India’s special operations capability around a Joint Special Operations Command (JSOC), many of the more chronic problems affecting training,
procurement, and information sharing most likely will endure.157 Indian strategic
commentators long have called for the creation of a JSOC, via which India’s community of special operators could be provided with “fully fused” informational
support from the nation’s notoriously factionalized intelligence agencies.158 While
the formation of India’s Defence Intelligence Agency in 2002, following the recommendations of the Kargil Review Committee, has led to better integration
among the services’ respective intelligence wings, reportedly there is still much
scope for improvement.159 This would necessitate the permanent deputation
of civilian intelligence officers drawn from all the relevant agencies, including
the Intelligence Bureau, which, while theoretically domestically oriented, plays
an important role along certain tracts of the Sino-Indian border. Optimizing
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the functionality of India’s (future) JSOC also would require providing it with
its own budget, requirements-validation process, and streamlined acquisition
procedures. This would enable it to fast-track much-needed items, such as night
vision devices and parachutes, bypassing the traditionally cumbersome procurement process of the Indian Ministry of Defence (MOD).
The existence of a JSOC also would bring about greater strategic and doctrinal clarity, along with more institutionalized joint training. For the time being,
India’s Para SFs have no organic air wing, and the IA air arm as yet does not
possess its own ground-attack capability. After years of bitter wrangling among
services, the MOD arbitrated in favor of the IAF retaining control, for the time
being, over newly acquired heliborne platforms critical for special operations and
airborne assault, such as the Apaches and Chinooks purchased from the United
States.160 While this is projected to change in the near future, the process points
to the persistent dysfunctionality of interservice relations, which could affect
the effectiveness and reactivity of Indian SOFs in the event of a crisis. With each
service striving to create its own SOF unit, there also has been a certain amount
of duplication in terms of core competencies and a relative absence of profound
reflection on what some of these newly formed units could bring in terms of
added value—this despite the existence since 2008 of a (classified) Indian Joint
Doctrine for Special Operations.161 The IAF’s Garud, for example, has yet truly to
evolve beyond its primary objective of protecting air bases and installations, a
task that could be relegated to a force already designed for such a purpose: the
paramilitary Central Industrial Security Force. There is a broad consensus within
India’s SOF community that where the Garud truly needs to focus its efforts is
on developing a core of highly trained JTACs and forward-deployed air combat–
control teams.162 Another core objective would be to specialize in the emergency
extraction of downed IAF pilots or groups of SFFs or Para SFs isolated behind
enemy lines.163 Yet, according to most interviewees, until now not much progress
has been made on these fronts.
When Prime Minister Narendra Modi came into office in May 2014, there was
hope in a few quarters that some long-advocated defense reforms, such as the
creation of a chief of defense staff, an aerospace command, a cyber command,
and a JSOC, finally would materialize. As time has gone by, hopes of sudden
and major reform under this government—whether in the realm of economy
or defense—have begun to dwindle. This does not mean, however, that there is
no movement.164 The current defense minister, Manohar Parrikar, reportedly
has sought inspiration from both past U.S. defense reforms and Israel’s ongoing
efforts to fashion a “Depth Corps Force” that would operate in symbiosis with a
new Israeli JSOC.165 During a visit to U.S. Pacific Command in early December
2015, Parrikar allegedly also sought details on the conduct of U.S. Air Force
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special operations, with the goal of applying these insights to the future development of the Garud.166
Some Indian interviewees noted, rather pessimistically, that major organizational reform might occur only in the wake of some form of catastrophe. This was
the case, for example, for the United States, which created its Special Operations
Command in the wake of the humiliating debacle of 1980’s Operation EAGLE
CLAW.167
Special Operations and the Question of Political Sponsorship
In his detailed, empirical study of the efficacy of past special operations, Colin
Gray points to the fundamental importance of “permissive domestic conditions,
and a tolerant political and strategic culture.”168 Owing to the unorthodox nature
of SOF tactics and the politically sensitive missions with which SOFs are often
entrusted, their use implies a certain risk tolerance on the part of political decision makers.
In 2015, the Indian government signed off on a much-publicized, and
relatively successful, Para SF raid into Myanmar. That operation, however, was
undertaken against lightly armed insurgents and with the acquiescence of the
Myanmar government.169 Most recently, IA SOFs allegedly carried out punitive
strikes against “terror launchpads” in Pakistan-occupied Kashmir, in response
to a bloody terrorist attack on Indian soil.170 At the time of this writing, the
specifics of the operation remain shrouded in uncertainty and subject to heated
speculation, particularly in the Indian and Pakistani press.171 According to some
of this author’s more-reliable sources, the operation was conducted by two units
of Para SFs (from the 4th and 9th Battalions), operating under cover of artillery
fire. Heliborne operations were limited to the drop-off and pickup points, from
which the SOFs proceeded on foot. Ghatak platoons drawn from regular army
units provided rear-area security, helping to ensure the safe extraction of the
Para SFs once their direct-action mission was completed.172 If this account is
accurate—and it may prove impossible to verify completely—it would not be the
first time India (or Pakistan) has deployed SOFs for shallow thrusts across the
Indo-Pakistani Line of Control.173 It is important to stress, however, the inherent
differences from employing SOFs in some of the China-related contingencies discussed in this paper. Deploying Indian SOF teams for more-prolonged missions,
deeper into contested territory, and against a far more capable adversary would
require a much greater willingness to embrace risk, friction, and uncertainty.174
On a broader level, successful covert action hinges on a clear intellectual understanding of the strategic value of special operations rather than a fixation on
short-term tactical gains.175 A previous section demonstrated that Indian security
managers have yet to develop a truly joint vision for special operations. Within
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the Indian media, for their part, commentary on SOF-related issues all too often
is confined narrowly to CT-related issues. A common refrain among Indian Para
SF officers is that India’s political leaders and public view special forces as “little
more than glorified infantry,” and through a narrow tactical lens rather than
strategically.176 What such statements imply is that SOFs frequently are reduced
to functioning as heavily armed substitutes for standard units, or are viewed as
shock troops—ancillary forces whose role is to support a wider war effort. While
there is certainly a danger in overly fetishizing special operations and in neglecting to integrate SOFs properly with conventional forces, there also are costs to
failing to appreciate the uniqueness of SOF attributes.177 As one U.S. study from
the 1990s eloquently articulated, “A military structured for linear, attritional
warfare gains little leverage from SOF operations. It correspondingly sees little
value in SOFs and would prefer that SOF assets be distributed broadly to the force
as a whole. By contrast, a force structured for thrusting along fault lines will use
SOF units to gain leverage by initiating the breach and by generating chaos in the
enemy’s rear.”178
A common criticism levied at the IA is precisely that it is structured for “linear,
attritional warfare,” not for “thrusting along fault lines.”179 Well-known South
Asianists have described India’s military strategy as one of restraint and as suffering from an absence of strategic initiative.180 While there may be some truth
to these characterizations, they are also far too sweeping.
Indeed, India’s very unique model of civil-military dysfunction, somewhat
paradoxically, has provided the armed services with a lot of leeway in the pursuit
of operational planning.181 As evidenced in the section detailing India’s strategy
of “offensive area denial” vis-à-vis its trans-Himalayan neighbor, the IA concept
of operations for a LAC-related contingency is far from passive or reactive. To
the contrary, it places a strong emphasis on regaining the initiative rapidly, on
conducting surgical strikes deep within the Chinese interior, and on horizontal
escalation across multiple sections of the border.
The question, however, is whether India’s political leadership would be willing
to sign off on these plans. Even though India’s current government seems intent
on signaling that it is less reticent to use force and risk escalation, much would
depend on the circumstances of the conflict and the exact nature of Chinese
aggression. A number of important questions remain open. Would India’s politicians be willing to accede to IA requests to extend the army’s operational ambit
far beyond the LAC? Would airpower be employed for standoff strikes across
the border, or would it remain confined to the Indian side, as during the Kargil
War?182 If some of the priority targets are communication and transportation
nodes within the TAR and the PLAAF and PLARF have not yet entered the fray,
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would India consider it more judicious to employ ground-based, deniable SOFs
rather than initiating a cycle of vertical escalation via targeted missile strikes and
the use of air-launched ordnance?
Perhaps most importantly, would India’s political leadership draw on its Tibet
“trump card” and exercise the special warfare option? New Delhi may be leery to
do so, for several reasons. First, it may fear a Chinese counterescalation in India’s
northeast, with all the attendant implications for India’s long-term stability and
its ability to secure the narrow Siliguri corridor that connects its northeastern
states to the Indian subcontinent.183 Second, such a move could encounter hostility from the current Tibetan government in exile, which officially has renounced
violence and historically has perceived Tibetan guerrilla movements as competing power structures within a heavily factionalized refugee community.184
Furthermore, within some segments of Indian society, sentiments toward the Tibetan community occasionally have verged on the hostile, and support for greater
Tibetan autonomy has not been uniformly robust.185 While the Modi government
has been more overtly supportive of the Tibetan cause than its predecessor, this
may not always be the case. Indian security managers may be unwilling to stoke
the flames of militancy for fear of inadvertently redirecting Tibetan nationalism
and thereby spawning yet another form of separatist movement on their own soil.
From a purely operational standpoint, an unconventional warfare campaign
would no doubt yield precious tactical dividends, by increasing Chinese rear-area
anxiety and compelling the PLA to tie down large numbers of troops in surveillance and garrison duties. If India’s goal in the event of conflict, however, is to
conclude hostilities rapidly on favorable terms, such a move could prove counterproductive, as it inevitably would lead to protraction, along with widespread
suffering among the Tibetan people, thus impeding war termination. In effect,
the wisest posture might be to maintain such a capability as a form of deterrent
and as part of a broader competitive strategy, and to resort to special warfare only
in the event of significant escalation on the part of China.186
The LAC constitutes the longest disputed land border in the world. For close to
six decades, the lack of resolution has served as a vivid reminder of the tensions
that linger at the heart of the Sino-Indian relationship. For New Delhi, the preservation of local superiority along the Himalayan belt is of paramount importance
and continues to inform its defense planning and force-structure plans.
This article has summarized the various correlations of military force along
the Sino-Indian border and has charted the changes in New Delhi’s operational
concepts and attitudes toward territorial defense. While Indian planners have
moved toward adopting a more-offensive form of area denial, they continue to
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rely, for the most part, on conventional forces that could be overcome or circumvented in the event of a fast-moving, localized, and limited border confrontation
launched from higher elevations. Taking into account the rugged nature of the
terrain and the continued paucity of infrastructure, a case has been made here
for a more reactive, distributed, and mobile force structure and for greater reliance on special forces, working in tandem with locally raised battalions of scouts.
Despite the existence of a large number of SOFs, along with plans for further
expansion, India has yet to articulate their role clearly and continues to view such
units as ancillaries to conventional troops rather than as potential force multipliers. While warning against an overreliance on special operators, this article has
laid out the operational benefits to be accrued from their tailored employment in
a number of potential Sino-Indian contingencies, ranging across a broad spectrum of conflict.
Before India is able to envisage such ambitiously minded concepts of operations, however, steps will need to be taken and reforms will need to be enacted.
These extend well beyond issues of equipment, training, and procurement;
defense management, political vision, and doctrinal definition will need to be
addressed. The long-discussed creation of a triservice JSOC would constitute
an important step forward. Perhaps most importantly, India’s security managers
will need to embrace an operational philosophy that places a greater emphasis
on rapidly regaining the initiative and on high-end asymmetric warfare. In short,
their mode of thinking may need to become more Chinese.
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